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THE ELIMINATION OF SURPRISE IN FEDERAL PRACTICE*
ALEXANDER HOLTZOFFt

There are occasions when in the interest of clarity of thought it
behooves us to get back to first principles. When brought back to
mind, these principles appear simple and obvious, but so much of
our life's work is devoted to details that the tendency is for the trees
to obscure the view of the forest, unless we stop at intervals and
refresh ourselves by recalling fundamentals.
The courts exist for the purpose of administering justice. The
objective of a law suit is to determine a controversy between man
and man by ascertaining the facts, finding the governing principles
of law, and applying them to the facts. At common law there developed what is known as the adversary system of litigation. The
merits of a controversy are determined by the presentation of facts
and arguments on the law by counsel, who are partisans on behalf
of the parties whom they represent. The judge, or the judge and
jury, as the case may be, reach their conclusions from the partisan
presentations. On the whole the system works well. In the course
of time, however, some deficiencies were found to exist and some
improvements were needed. Every human institution must be improved with time. Nothing can stand still. It will either progress or
go backward. At common law each of the parties was free to procure
his evidence where he found it, but was at liberty to withhold any
information from his adversary. Either party could secure his evidence and obtain his information from any source whatever, except
that he could not require his opponent to disclose what the latter
knew. It was otherwise in equity. From early days the Chancellors,
who originally were prelates, adopted the practice of ecclesiastical
law of permitting each party to search the conscience of his opponent
and for that purpose to require the latter to answer written interrogatories, which sometimes were deep and penetrating.
Since the court and the jury must determine the merits of the
controversy, they have a right, in the interest of justice, to have before them all of the available evidence, no matter in whose possession
it may be found. Under our system of trials, however, the courts do
not ordinarily search for evidence on their own initiative and have
no machinery for doing so. They are dependent upon counsel for
the respective parties to produce all of the available and pertinent
* The substance of this paper was delivered before the Insurance Section
of the American Bar Association at the annual meeting in Boston, in August,
1953; and before the Connecticut Bar Association in Hartford, in October, 1953.
t United States District Judge, District of Columbia.

19541

ELIMINATION OF SURPRISE

information. It gradually became evident that without according to
each party the right to bring out into the open whatever evidence may
be in the possession of his adversary, justice cannot always be effected.
The code states were among the first to take steps to destroy
some of these restrictions. They developed the practice of permitting
each party to take the deposition of his opponent prior to the trial.
In some states, this procedure is known as an "examination before
trial." By this means a great deal of evidence has been often unearthed, which otherwise might have remained concealed. Incidentally, it has frequently led to shortening trials by abbreviating
the evidence to be introduced and narrowing the issues. In addition,
it at times has led to the abandonment of claims or defenses that
could not stand the light of day.
As originally introduced, however, the use of this weapon was
seriously circumscribed. In some of the states an adverse party could
be questioned only for the purpose of securing evidence on which
the examining party had the burden of proof. He might not be
interrogated concerning his own case. A still further and drastic
limitation was that only such evidence could be elicited as would
be admissible at the trial. Some jurisdictions evolved the practice
of written interrogatories, which were an outgrowth of old equity
pleading and practice. Written interrogatories, however, are frequently not as efficacious as an oral examination.
These developments, inadequate as they were, began to batter
down the ancient walls. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure completed the task and entirely demolished them. The new procedureif a procedure that has been in effect for 15 years can still be called
new-effectively carried out the basic concept that the purpose of
litigation is not to conduct a contest or to oversee a game of skill,
but to do justice as between the parties and to decide controversies
on their merits. For this purpose the courts are entitled to have laid
before them all available and pertinent material. With this end in
view, each party may procure all germane information no matter in
whose possession it may be, subject of course to the rule of privilege.
It necessarily follows that each party has the right to have made
available to it whatever relevant data may be in the possession of his
adversary. The new rules operate on this principle. They do not
just render lip service to this doctrine but actually carry it into
practice from day to day.
The limitations that a party may secure from his opponent only
such evidence as is admissible at the trial, and only such proof as
will support his own case, are gone. The old doctrine that discovery
may not be used for the purpose of a fishing expedition has been
thrown into discard. In fact, fishing is permitted if there is a reason-
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able prospect of fish being caught. All this is done in the interest
of reducing to a minimum what years ago was so aptly called by
Professor Wigmore, I believe, "the sporting theory of justice." We
must again emphasize that litigation is not a sport and that it is
not a game, but a serious effort to do justice.
Frequently a party may not be in possession of evidence admissible
at the trial, but may know where such evidence can be found. It
makes no sense, either as a matter of reason or as a matter of justice,
to say that he should not be required to disclose the sources of
evidence. For example, in an accident case he may have the names
of eye witnesses. In many instances it may be necessary to ascertain
what documentary evidence is available. Examples may be multiplied
ad infinitum. The new procedure permits the use of discovery not
only for the purpose of obtaining evidence, but also of ascertaining
where evidence may be secured.
I have never heard any argument advanced against this innovation
except the contention that a litigant should not be required to help
his adversary. This suggestion has been made from time to time in
various forms. It cannot withstand penetrating analysis. Why should
not one party to a law suit be compelled to disclose information in
his possession, even if it will aid his opponent? The moment one
gets rid of the idea that a trial of a law suit is a contest, and accepts
the premise, as one must, that its purpose is to ascertain the truth
and enable the court to do justice, it follows that there should be
no right on the part of either party to withhold pertinent information
from the court. The manner in which the court can obtain such
information is to enable the adverse party to secure and produce
it. I venture to suggest that this is in accord with elementary
principles of justice and logic.
In this respect civil litigation must be treated differently from
criminal cases. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, it is an inherent
right of the accused to stand mute and to decline to furnish any
information that may help convict him. In this country this principle
is safeguarded by the Constitution of the United States and by most,
if not all, state constitutions. Even in criminal cases, however, it cannot be said that this right is a part of the law of nature. It is something that is accorded to the defendant in countries where AngloAmerican jurisprudence prevails, but not elsewhere. For instance,
in French courts, the defendant is subject to interrogation. The
precise, logical, Gallic mind takes the position that the best way of
ascertaining the facts is to ask the person who knows most about
them and that person, of course, is the defendant. One of the first
and most important items of business at a criminal trial in France
is a searching and sometimes hostile interrogation of the defendant
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by the presiding judge. Naturally, in the light of our zeal to preserve
the rights of the accused, we would not tolerate such a procedure, because it is abhorrent to our fundamental ideas. No such principles,
however, are applicable to civil cases. It has always been the rule
that a party to a law suit may call his adversary to the witness
stand. No reason appears why the far-reaching step taken by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not in accord with this tendency,
and why an adverse party should not be required to disclose to his
opponent before the trial relevant information as well as admissible
evidence. To be sure this course reduces the element of surprise to
a minimum. For this very reason, in the interest of arriving at just
results, this step is an important move in the right direction. Ordinarily, in a present day law suit in a federal court, what with taking
of depositions of parties and witnesses, discovery of documents,
medical examinations, and pre-trial, there is little that either counsel
does not know about the matter by the time the trial has arrived.
I have already stated that a trial should not be regarded as a
contest or a game of skill. I might now add that it should not be
viewed as a melodrama or a mystery play, in which the success of
the performance depends upon keeping the denouement secret from
the beholders and leaving them in a state of suspense until the end.
There are indeed rare occasions in which surprise has a legitimate
function to perform in a trial of a civil case. For example, if the
plaintiff's claim is absolutely fraudulent and the fraud can be exposed
either on cross-examination or by extrinsic evidence, the ends of
justice may at times be best achieved by lulling the plaintiff into
security and taking him by surprise. For example, I remember a case
tried before me in which the plaintiff sued to recover damages for
personal injuries said to have resulted from a fall on a rainy day
on a wet floor in a department store. The facts that the floor was
wet and that the plaintiff fell on it were not disputed. The plaintiff
claimed that as a result of the accident he was required to have
an operation on his knee at a famous medical clinic. On cross-examination the plaintiff was confronted by written statements made by
him to his employer, from which it appeared that he had gone to this
clinic, not for the purpose of the operation, but to see his wife, and
that while staying in the city where the clinic was located, he went
ice-skating, fell on the ice and injured his knee. The operation on
the knee was necessitated by this accident. I need hardly say that it
took the jury but a few minutes to find a verdict in favor of the
defendant. The use of surprise was legitimate in this instance. The
new rules do not bar it. Such cases, however, do not occur very
frequently. Claims or defenses that are actually fraudulent are
comparatively few and far between. There are many claims and
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defenses that are exaggerated or padded, which is an entirely different thing.
On the other hand, the element of surprise sometimes frustrates
the ends of justice. For example, instances are not unknown of a
party to a negligence action producing at the last moment at the trial
a witness who is claimed to have been a bystander or a passerby and
to have seen the accident. That witness may be a perjurer. This has
actually happened, though rarely of course. Yet the adverse party
has no opportunity to investigate and determine whether the witness
really saw the accident. How much better it is for each party to
require the other to submit in advance of the trial a list of all persons
who are claimed to have seen the accident. This does not require
either side to call all of such witnesses, but it would preclude either
party from producing a surprise eyewitness, the truth of whose testimony could not be investigated at the last moment.
I am afraid that what I have been saying sounds very elementary.
If so, I have achieved my objective, because we are in fact dealing
with matters that should be governed by elementary first principles.
The new Federal Rules have been justly acclaimed as an outstanding
advance in judicial procedure. Broad discovery is an important feature
of the new practice. It should be remembered that the rules expressly
leave residual control in the trial judges over the application of
the Rules in order to enable the courts to prevent their abuse and
their becoming a vexatious burden. The judge is clothed with full
discretionary power to stop the use of the discovery weapons for
harassment or other ulterior motives. Judges do not hesitate to invoke
this authority in proper cases. I earnestly urge that no attempt be
made to turn the clock back by an endeavor to narrow the scope of
the discovery rules.
Occasionally there has been a misunderstanding as to one of the
aspects of federal discovery procedure. The objection has been raised
that under the Federal Rules, counsel may see his opponent's file.
This apprehension is not well-founded. No such result is in fact
permitted. While depositions may be taken on notice, discovery and
inspection of documents may be procured only by an order of the
court granted on motion. In order to secure this relief, it is necessary
to identify specific documents, to indicate that they probably constitute or contain evidence relevant to the issues, and further, to
make a showing of good cause for the inspection.'
The Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor2 expressly held that
discovery and inspection should not be ordered as to such papers as
constitute the "work product" of a lawyer; that is, statements, memo.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
2. 329 U.S. 495, 67 Sup. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947).
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randa and other similar papers, prepared by the lawyer, unless
there are exceptional circumstances. Consequently, what with the
limitations to which I have just referred, and the power expressly
vested in the courts to prevent abuse and to limit discovery to its
proper channels, there need be no fear that improper use of discovery
procedure may be permitted at will. The discovery procedure provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes a farreaching advance in the interests of achieving justice.

